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Talking Backl to Feminist Postmodernis m
Toward a New Radical Feminist Interpretation of the Body
If the body is a metaphor for our locatedness in space and tim e
and thusfor the finitude ofhumanperception andknowledge ,
then the postmodern body is no body at all .
Susan Bordo
If there is one thing that is clear in feminist postmodernism as the new millenniu m
begins, it is that bodies are texts. And textual as they are, they are no longer the flesh and bloo d
sites of oppression and liberation feminists theorized thirty years ago . They are sites of play,
sites of performance, sites of chatechresis. I am interested in a new radical feminist account tha t
both draws from the theoretical developments that turned the body into a text, and re-turns the
body to its flesh and blood. This effort will take us into one of the central insights of feminis t
postmodernism's 2 account of agency, and subject this account to a Marxian turn on its head, in
order to bring the body out of its textual playground and back to earth . "Back to earth" is meant
literally here, as the earth itself in the "naive" extra-textual sense, is both what brings us back
and what we come back to .
This project is motivated by a certain dismay at the distance between feminist "high
theory" in the U.S. and the most pressing political and social issues of our times . Particularly, in
the face of unprecedented levels of global environmental destruction, we seem to be unable to
articulate our relationship to the planet we inhabit in a politically meaningful way . The textual
body, or in some accounts the virtual body, seems to have little relation to the body of the Earth,
seems in fact to be the realization of that quintessential Euro-masculine fantasy of emancipation
from necessity, where "necessity" serves as a negative marker for the relationship of dependence
between humans and our environments, between persons and places .
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A new radical feminist account of the body will call for a re-marking of this relation, and
will draw on the feminist postmodern theory of "subjectivation" to do so.. Radical feminists
reading feminist postmodern theory have tended to respond defensively and dismissively . I find
this response understandable but not particularly fruitful . It is understandable because radica l
feminism has itself been a prime target of derision and dismissal at the hands of theorist s
engaged in the development of feminist postmodernism, to such an extent that I think the
"critique" of radical feminism has often functioned as an excuse for not reading radical feminist
work, or for not taking it seriously
. But a responding dismissal is not particularly fruitful .
Radical feminist philosophy, like any thinking politics, needs to engage criticism in order t o
move forward
. We need to read feminist postmodern theory closely, but we needn't read it
literally
. There are many ways to read postmodernism, one of the most promising of which is as
an expression of the phenomenology of life under globalization, 3 under threat of environmental
destruction
. A critical reading can bring postmodern insights out of the discursive universe an d
into a philosophical engagement with lived bodies, and the body of the planet that sustains them
(us) .
How The Body Became a Text
Before the body became a text, it was, for U.S. American feminists, already a complicated thing.
Of course, to call the body a "thing" is to lie about it already-is to belie the complexity tha t
1970's feminists tried to engage
. Variously theorized as the site of oppression, or the site o f
liberation; women's bodies, whether objectified, violated, pleasured, over-worked, under-paid ,
wholly natural, socially constructed, or given by the goddess, were of central concern to secon d
wave feminists
. Early second wave women's liberation politics called for social policies that
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would give women control over their own bodies, particularly when it came to reproductive
freedoms and sexuality, but also in connection with `women's" work Closely on the heels o f
this call came another, the demand to end violence against women . First the rape crisi s
movement then the movement against domestic violence addressed the social situation of women
who were victims of male violence. The issue of women's control over our bodies wa s
connected with broader issues of sexual socialization, male dominance, economi c
disenfranchisement, housework, and sexuality as a site of women's oppression . A burgeoning
lesbian feminist movement theorized lesbianism as resistance to male domination, an d
androgyny as embodied resistance or "conscientious objection"4 to feminine socialization.
In the 1980s, the question of women controlling their bodies got even more complex.
Much of this complexity hinged on whether or not many of the things women were doing with
their bodies were seen as expressions of women's control over their bodies or lack of
	
Was it
an expression of women's control over their bodies to sell them in pornography or prostitution ?
Could a woman choose, was it in fact an expression of her control over her body and thus
liberating for her to choose, "violation" in the form of masochistic sex? Could traditiona l
femininity be liberating if a woman chose it? Could the decision to change her sex surgically
and hormonally be an expression of her right to control her own body? These questions entere d
what came to be called "the sex debates" in feminism with a vengeance . To oversimplify a bit,
how one answered them determined which side one was on . "No" to all of the above made one a
radical feminist--the other side called you "anti-sex" or "cultural feminist" or "victim feminist",
and later "essentialist". "Yes" to all of the above made one a pro-sex feminist-the other sid e
called you "sex libertarian" or "anti-feminist" . Sitting the fence was another option, one that
many feminists who felt allied with neither camp chose .
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The 1990s brought a new turn to feminist philosophies of the body . The "pro-sex"
feminists " von", at least in academic feminist contexts in the U .S . Their focus on "free choice"
in a rabidly individualist and voluntarist cultural milieu secured what can only be called a
hegemony in U .S. academia for "pro-sex" feminism . Their notions of the body cohered mor e
comfortably with postmodern theories than radical feminist notions . Postmodern theory had
become more appealing to many feminists, and a new alliance between postmodernism an d
feminism6 was fast replacing the older alliance with Marxism . ? The feminist alliance with
postmodernism has created a dramatic shift in feminist approaches to the question of the body .
One mark of this change is the collapse of the central conceptual paradigm tha t
distinguished sex and gender, a collapse which occurred initially both inside and outside of th e
new feminist postmodernism. The old feminist distinction between sex (as natural an d
biological) and gender (as social and cultural) was questioned in social constructionist accounts
that recognized gender's influence in how sex was defined, articulated culturally, and lived . 8 The
value of these insights for feminism should not be underestimated . Initially change was fought
for on the field of gender. But sex always returned as that natural, God-given, immutable fact o f
women's existence . Women have babies . If they don't have babies, at least they can. This is
what sex .is, and sex is presocial . Therefore every social policy that could be justified by
reference to "real" sexual differences was. It was essential for feminists to question the sanctity
of what was defined as presocial sex . As Catharine MacKinnon put it, "To limit efforts to end
gender inequality at the point where biology or sexuality is encountered, termed differences ,
without realizing that these exist in law or society only in terms of their specifically sexist socia l
meanings, amounts to conceding that gender inequality may be challenged so long as the centra l
epistemological pillars of gender as a system of power are permitted to remain standing (1989,
Talking Back to Feminist Postmodernism
	
5
233)." Gender became the primary of the two terms for feminists, but not as a superstructura l
formation of natural sex. Neither gender nor sex were seen as natural. Sex was a function o f
gender .
This critique was extended so much in postmodern accounts, that the gendered body
today is not only cultural rather than biological, constructed rather than natural, but textual rathe r
than material, or in some accounts virtual rather than real . Gender is contingent, malleable, and
performative. It is not particularly intransigent . Such cultural "performances" as drag
demonstrate that there is no "original" or "authentic" gender, to play around with, all gender is ,
essentially, gender play. 9 The gendered body has become, in feminist postmodern accounts, the
quintessential simulacrum, the copy for which there is no original . i0 Today, the reigning wisdom
in academic feminism sees the body as a discursive site . The body has turned into a text .
Judith Butler and the Teatualization of the Bod y
Though one cannot attribute all of the positions in the above paragraph to Judith Butler,
no feminist has been more influential in the development of feminist postmodernism in the U.S.
than she has. Understandings, misunderstandings, and reworkings of her work are the bedroc k
of what counts as "good" feminist thinking in much of academia . At feminist conferences ,
hardly a session goes by without some positive attention to her writings, or favorable mention of
her deconstruction of the central categories of second wave feminist thinking .
Butler's work has been key in the importation of the epistemology of the simulacrum Int o
feminist theory. The early feminist epistemology of unmasking, of sorting through appearance s
to get to the real underneath, has been discredited as "essentialist ."11 Feminist standpoint
epistemology was an attempt to respond to this accusation by using social location as a
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"standpoint" from which at least local and situated knowledge could be articulated . 12 But it i s
the epistemology of the simulacrum that has become hegemonic for feminism at the turn of the
millennium. Here "the real" plays a part only as that which dissolves into the appearances
themselves. Behind the appearances, if there were such a place, would be only an abyss of
absence. " 3
I want to take a closer look at how this epistemology functions in Butler's book on th e
body, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex." I am interested in a critical
reading of Butler's notions of interpellation, of "constitutive outside," and of her deconstructio n
of the notion of matter, not simply in order to say what I think she got wrong . Rather, I find her
work, read critically, provides important provocation for the development of a new radica l
feminist philosophy of the body.
In Bodies That Matter, Butler sets out to deal with some of the trouble that her former
book, Gender Trouble, left unaddressed. She is responding to criticism that her earlier work left
out "the material body." "The question was repeatedly formulated to mp in this way," write s
Butler, "`What about the materiality of the body, Judy?' I took it that the addition of `Judy' was
an effort to dislodge me from the more formal `Judith' and to recall'me to a bodily life that coul d
not be theorized away . There was a certain exasperation in the delivery of that final diminutive,
a certain patronizing quality which (re)constructed me as an unruly child, one who needed to b e
brought to task, restored to that bodily being which is, after all, considered to be most real, mos t
pressing, most undeniable . . . And if I persisted in this notion that bodies were in some wa y
constructed, perhaps I really thought that words alone had the power to craft bodies from their
own linguistic substance (ix-x)?" Butler sets out to look more closely at what it means to say tha t
bodies are socially constructed .
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She disavows what she calls "linguistic monism," where "socially constructed" means w e
are simply ,*ubj-ected-by-tangu-age, --and-agency-is-done-away-with entirely . -Rut-she is equally at
pains to distance herself from a voluntarist notion of the subject, a notion some readers found in
the idea of "genderperformativity," so central to-Gender Trouble . if-gender-is something -we
perform, than doesn't a "willful and instrumental subject, one who decides on its gender (x)" do
the perforn ing?- How-is it possible within-this-framework to preserve "gender-practices as sites
of agency (x)," while avoiding the two extremes, of a voluntarist subject or no subject at all ?
Butler's an wer to-this-question uiiies-in the faun of what-she-calls "constitutive -consti aint
(xi)"
Butler is indebted here to Foucault and Althusser. Foucault's notion ofassujetissement
"is not only-a-subordination but a sec Ling and -maintaining, a-puttinginto-place ofa subject ; a
subjectivation (34)." Social construction is the process tfrough which the subject is subjected i n
the double dense of bound-and- made . Agency -is-as-nmch a-product of the bending as-is
"oppression". "To claim that the subject is itself produced in and as a gendered matrix of
relations is pot-to -do-away with the subject, t only-to-ask -dflel -the-conditions of its eliieigeuc e
and operation (7) ." Althusser's notion of interpellation is key to Butler's account as well . "In
Althusser'smution ofinterpeilaiuua,-it is thepoli-ce-who initiate-the tall or address-by-which a
subject becomes socially constituted. There is the policeman, the one who not only represent s
the law but, whoseatldiess `Hey you!' l,as the effect -ofbinding-theiaw to-the-one who is-hailed.
This `one' who appears not to be in a condition of trespass prior to the call (for whom the cal l
establishes a given practice as a -trespass) is not fully a social subject, is not-fully subjectivated ,
for he or she is not yet reprimanded . The reprimand does not merely repress or control the
subject, but fuf L LS a. (*Lucia] pat t of the juridical and social- fcaunatiunuf the-subject . Theta is
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formative, if not performative, precisely because it initiates the individual into the subjected
status of the subject (1993 : 121)." Butler's own example is of the doctor whose exclamation ,
"It's a girl!" is the first interpellating speech act that begins the process of "girling the girl"
(1993, 7-8) .
Interpellation, a kind of subjectivating definition, works as much through what i s
excluded as what is included . "To what extent," Butler asks, "is materialization governed b y
principles of intelligibility that require and institute a domain of radical unintelligibility that
resists materialization altogether or that remains radically dematerialized (35) ." One way to
understand this is certainly through what happens to intersexed infants . Between the culturally
intelligible "It's a girl!" and "It's a boy!" is only the culturally unintelligible. What is
unintelligible will not be "materialized" in that the material body of the infants will be altered t o
conform to one or the other intelligible cultural options . l4
The unintelligible functions for Butler as a "constitutive outside" for the intelligible .
Butler's whole notion of "constitutive outside" is the key to her response to the question of the
material body
. The criticism has been, of course, that she has neglected what is most outside
discourse, the body, but Butler's response pulls the body back into discourse . "for there is an
`outside' to what is constructed by discourse, but this is not an absolute `outside,' an ontologica l
thereness that exceeds or counters the boundaries of discourse ; as a constitutive `outside' it is
that which can only be thought-when it can-in relation to that discourse, at and as its most
tenuous borders (8)
." This "outside" will return to disrupt the coherence of the intelligible, and
will return internally. "A constitutive or relative outside is, of course, composed of a set o f
exclusions that are nevertheless internal to that system as its own nonthematizable necessity . It
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emerges within the system as incoherence, disruption, a threat to its own systematicity (39) ." The
"outside" was always the objected and unacknowledged heart ofthe "inside" .
Butler's deconstruction of the whole notion of "matter" is meant to show that "matter"
Operates as a constitutive outside for the social, a "pre-social" That the social requires for its own
self-definition. But "matter has a history (29)," and it is to the history of matter as a sign tha t
Butler turns her critique . Her account of this history is convincing, and she uncovers "a violation
that founds the very concept of matter (53)," and its discursive function, "as the site at which a
certain drama of sexual difference plays itself out (49) ." Far from being the presocial "outside"
to constructionist accounts, matter returns as the very notion that is socially constructed in the
delimitation of the difference between the social and presocial . And this delimitation is far from
innocent, it is complicit in the entire story of heterosexual hegemony . "To return to matter
requires that we return to matter as a sign . . .(49)," she argues, since what we say about matter is
always already caught up in the chain of signification that constructs it as a concept . After all,
"the body posited as prior to the sign, is always posited or signified asprior. - This signification
produces as an effect of its own procedure the very body that it nevertheless and simultaneousl y
claims to discover as that which precedes its own action If the body signified as prior to
signification is an effect of signification, then the mimetic or representational status of language,
which claims that signs follow bodies as their necessary mirrors, is not mimetic at all . On the
contrary it is productive, constitutive, one might even argue performative, inasmuch as the
signifying act delimits and contours the body that it then claims to find prior to any and al l
signification (30) ." In the beginning was the sign, on the second day, the body was born into
discourse. ' 5
Talking Back to Feminist Postmodernism
|
10
I find Butler's deconstruction of the concept of matter convincing, moving even, an d
important for feminism. It is not, however, an adequate response to the question she purports to
be addressing, which is not about the concept of matter at all . The question is about extra-
discursive matter . To ask the question of the material body, is to ask the question of th e
relationship between the extra-discursive and the discursive. To "return to matter as a sign" i s
precisely to misunderstand the question, since matter as a sign is not in question. The question
has to do, rather, with the stubborn fact of the existence of matter extra-discursively. -Butler's
use of the notion of "constitutive outside" serves only to defer the question of a real outside.
Instead of grappling with an outside to discourse, she merely does away with the outside by
showing how things that are conceptually excluded from certain notions, such as matter is to the
social, are internally constitutive of such notions. Butler has essentially, and rightfully, pointed
out that our concept of the social contains a repressed concept of the presocial that i s
foundational for it . This is not an unimportant accomplishment, because Butler also slows that
the unintelligibility of the "constitutive outside" of such concepts functions politically in often
heinous ways-and making the unintelligible intelligible is important political work. We think
of matter as an innocent and presocial thing, while the concept we think it with, "matter," ha s
been everything but innocent and pre-social .
If we accept this, which I certainly do, we are still left with the question of an outside that
is not merely internally constitutive in Butler's terms, an outside that is not reducible to a
moment of exclusion on the inside of the discursive "system," which is, it seems, able to diges t
just about anything. She has shown that conceptually, "matter," like every other term, can be
deconstructively devoured by discourse theory
. She has shown that how we think and live ou r
bodies is discursively constrained
. Butler has answered her interlocutors by brilliantly
Talking Back to Feminist Postmodernism
	
1 1
illuminating a relationship between concepts but they have not asked after a relationship between
concepts, they have asked after the relationship between a body as what precedes, exceeds ,
resists, or escapes discourse-and the discursive .
But ,M a briefpassage entitled "Are Bodies Purely Discursive," Butler does give a n
answer to the complaint I raise above . I am essentially accepting the philosophical position that
the being of a concept, "matter" and the being of matter itself, are ontologically distinct and that
this distinction is important . Neither need be "presocial" in the sense of unimpacted by o r
implicated in social or political relations of power. The ontological distinction between them
does not mean that they are radically separate, but it does mean neither is reducible to the other .
To return to our example above of the intersexed infant, the unintelligibility of the infant's body
to the doctors or parents results in a material intervention/violation of the infant's body . What
Butler calls the "chain of signification" is instrumental in the "re-materialization" (to use what is
certainly too neutral and innocent a term) of the infant's body as intelligibly male or female . But
the intersexed body was there to begin with, and it is significant that many adults who discove r
that they were surgically "corrected" as infants experience a deep sense of violation at the
revelation (Kessler, 1994) . My example here is meant to counter Butler's assertion that i f
"materiality is considered ontologically distinct from language," then "the possibility that
language might be able to indicate or correspond to that domain of radical alterity," i s
undermined (68) .
She goes on to argue that it is the ontological similarity between the two that provides th e
ground for a possible relationlanguage is itself material . The "phenomenafity" of the
signifying process requires, after all, that language make a material appearance, whether a s
sound, words on a page, or gestures . But in the next moment, a new "radical difference" is
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introduced_ "Apart from and yet related to the materiality of the signifier is the materiality of the
signified as well as the referent approached through the signified, but which remains irreducibl e
to the signified . This radical difference between referent and signified is the site where th e
materiality of language and that of the world which it seeks to signify are perpetually negotiate d
(my emphasis, 69)." The "radical difference" here is hard to pin down, it seems to exist in th e
irreducibility of the referent to the signified, i .e. the material body is not reducible to what w e
mean when we say "material body," which is not reducible to the sign itself "material body"
-
though all are material . It is unclear why this"irredbcibitityP ' does not constitute an ontological
difference, and it is equally unclear why, if it did, this would mean that the "referentiality o f
language," would be undermined .
Indeed, elsewhere Butler raises these same questions, and responds tO them ver y
convincingly . In a searing criticism of Lacan, Butler takes on the notion that an ontological
difference between the penis and the phallus necessarily sets the phallus free of its debt to th e
penis, to operate as a privileged signifier. Summarizing Lacan's position, Butler writes,'°Th e
phallus symbolizes the penis, and insofar as it symbolizes the penis, retains the penis as tha t
which it symbolizes ; it is not the penis. . . The more symbolization occurs the less ontological
connection there is between symbol and symbolized . . . Symbolization depletes that which i s
symbolized of its ontological connection with the symbol itself (83-84) ." Against this argument ,
Butler asks, "What is the status of this particular assertion of ontological difference . . . if the penis
becomes [always] the privileged referent to be negated?" In spite of their different kinds o f
being, "the phallus is bound to the penis through determinate negation
. Indeed, the phallu s
would be nothing without the penis (84) ." By what assumption could we conclude that differen t
kinds of being so radically escape one another? What is the status of the assertion that an
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ontological difference between the being of language and the being of materiality would
necessarily seal them off from one another rather than help to explain their relation to one
another? Yet such an assertion would maintain the irreducibility of the one to the other, whic h
Butler purports to want to do as well, so why the denial?
Her denial of the ontological difference between language and materiality seems to be
what enables Butler to re-collapse materiality back into language-to ultimately sidestep th e
very irreducibility she claims to defend. She defines the question of the relationship between the
two as follows : "To answer the question of the relation between the materiality of bodies an d
that of language requires first that we offer an account ofhow it is that bodies materialize(m y
emphasis, 69) ." Butler's "requires first" serves to establish a priority . From here, where will her
account take us? Back to language, which again becomes the privileged and indeed active term
of the two--language materializes the body_ The example of the intersexed infant certainl y
shows that language, in the fuller sense of a "chain of signification" and an arbiter o f
intelligibility, does and can impact the material world in heinous ways_ Yet the infant had a
body, certainly, before it was surgically altered, that was materialized outside of the `chain o f
signification"-and this body is not to be reduced to a "constitutive outside," to a mere functio n
of the system of gender intelligibility . This body is what we feel has been violated when we
respond to the surgical "sexing" of intersexed infants with horror_ We recognize there wa s
something there, however "unintelligible" before the "materialization" of the body into the
intelligibility of the chain of signification. But in Butler's account the body is reduced, again, to
a mere function of discourse.
It remains unclear why we are bound-"required first"-- to approach the question in the
way Butler prescribes . Required by whom? If we must ask first after the materialization of the
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body (in language), then the intersexed body of the infant is disciplined out of our inquiry . It
would be something like an original, for which there is no copy--and in the world of discours e
we can attend only to the copies, for which there are no originals . Why would we not ask after
the material materialization of the body-or has this materialization been rendered unintelligibl e
by discourse theory? Why would we not ask how language is materialized, and find our answe r
in the body? Isn't it, after all, the body that materializes language-how would we speak withou t
breath, write without any body at all? The material materializers of the body--breath, water ,
food, light and warmth--sustain our speech . This materiality certainly merits our attention .
Could it be that Butler's account serves to deconstructively discipline the body into occupying a
discursive universe, sealed against the possibility of an ontologically different, and now
discursively unintelligible, materiality? Could it be that the tendency Butler takes note of; the
tendency of bodies to "indicate a world beyond themselves," is effectively effaced, or in he r
terms abjected, by the active and determinate role assigned here to language as the materializes
of the body?
Disciplining Feminis m
Since asserting this difference, an ontological difference between words and things, wil l
open me to charges of "essentialism," a lengthy digression is necessary here, to call into questio n
the status of that particular accusation . Particularly in the U .S . American context, feminists ten d
now to identify any talk of the extra textual body as "Essentialist!", where the word in it
accusatory form functions to discredit and silence . Even social constructionist approaches to the
body, if they do not see the body as sufficiently textual and contingent, are accused of "falling
into" essentialist traps . '6
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Emphatic anti-essentialism is part of what defines the alliance between feminist thought
and postmodernism.. The terms serves to "mark" something as antithetical to postmodernism ,
and increasingly, antithetical to feminism . The philosophical and political stakes that make the
question of essentialism such a charged one remain largely unaddressed . This is to say it
functions as the antithesis of postmodem correctness. The accusation "essentialist!" has come t o
exercise a disciplinary force among feminists, while attempts at critical intervention receive far
too little attention. '? Particularly when it comes to feminist theories of the body, it is important t o
consider how anti-essentialism functions to derail feminist investigations of the lived body,
before they have even been seriously undertaken .
I use the descriptive term "emphatic" to differentiate postmodern anti-essentialism from
earlier feminist and anti-racist criticism which stressed that the wrong sorts of essentializin g
notions were applied to women or various races . Starting with Beauvoir's manifesto-like
proclamation that women are made not born, '8 feminists threw the patriarchal claim that
"biology is destiny" under the light of critical scrutiny. Women's hormones, anatomy, and
physiology (especially in terms of menstruation and reproduction) did not and could not justif y
the political and social domination of women by men. Feminists set out to "tell the truth" about
women, against what were recognized as essentializing fictions, using language in the proces s
that essentialized women in another way . This later discovery came first from women of color
and lesbians who criticized the falsely inclusive use of the category of "woman" much as othe r
feminists had criticized the falsely inclusive categories of "mankind" or "human" . 19 Monique
Wittig's own manifesto, "Lesbians are not women," functioned as an ironic addition t o
Beauvoir's earlier claims . 2° These criticisms surfaced initially in the context of feminis t
political work, and were sparked by very concrete issues of power within the feminist
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movement .21 They neither defined essentialism so broadly, nor disregarded it on principle 22 as is
generally the case today.
The academic theorization of essentialism in the late 80s and 90s, however, has become a
quest for theory purified of essentialism . 23 This took the form initially of academic feminist s
pitting postmodern theory against older activist-based feminist theory, and finding feminis t
theory inadequate24 Particularly, feminist theory in its "radical feminist" " form, was found to
be essentialist . 26 "Essentialist!" took on almost battle-cry status in academic feminist circles ,
and the accusation became one that both shamed and discredited . Efforts to critically intervene
in this situation, have been passionate, and have come from many corners of the feminis t
movement . Yet these politically diverse voices have been too few and far between to stem the
tide of anti-essentialist orthodoxy. I quote just three of a myriad of such efforts from diverse
thinkers in feminism here, in order to show that the critical response to anti-essentialism has bee n
widespread, though apparently having little impact .
Has essentialism received a bad rap? Few other words in the vocabulary of
contemporary critical theory are so persistently maligned so little interrogated
and so predictably summoned as a -term-of infallible critique . . . as an egression of
disapprobation and disparagement (Fuss 1989, xi).
The term 9serrtialism-eovers a range of metaeriticat meanings and strategic uses
that go the very short distance from convenient label to buzz word Many who ,
like myself, have been involved with feminist critical theory for some time and
who did use the term, initially, as a serious critical concept, have grown impatien t
with this word--essentialism-time and again repeated with its reductive ring, its
self righteous tone of superiority, its contempt for "them "|those guilty of it (de
Lauretis 1994, I) .
"Essentialism" is the nemesis of "post-modernist" feminism_ It is its chief targe t
of attack, and yet the critique of "essentialism" relies on the very framework post -
modernism is at such pains to reject. The meaning of "essentialism" depends on
a master narrative of truth. "Essentialism" is to be avoided because it is false ,
and it is judged to be false from a position which is outside all positions, on
criteria which would be everywhere and always the same (Thompson 1996, 334) .
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Despite these critical voices, today, the term "essentialist" functions more than ever t o
discipline feminist thinkers in the academy, rather than to inspire careful scholarship. 27
"Essentialist!" has become an interpellation, a performative speech act . I borrow my terms here
from Butler herself, but deploy them in an unusual direction, perhaps even catechresticly . The
accusatory "Essentialist" has come to function with a self-legitimating authority, to "essentializ e
the essentialist," whose work need not be-carefully read or responded to once this accusation has
functioned to dismiss it as "bad feminism ."2 8
•It is impossible to deny that the concerns motivating feminist anti-essentialism, even i n
its emphatic form, are deep and serious . Particularly, real movement-based political struggles
over exclusion and inclusion have fueled the anti-essentialist fire . Yet emphatic anti-
essentialism has served much less as a political corrective to inequalities of power between
women, which remain, in academia, remarkably unchanged-than as an intellectual policing tool
that marks theory as pure or impure . This situation has far -reaching implications for feminism _
Feminist efforts to think, write, speak, campaign, protest and in general charge the ways
women's bodies are controlled socially and lived personally, extra-textually, ate curtailed .
Dependence
It is important to consider what is disciplined out of feminist philosophies of the body b y
emphatic anti-essentialism. A careful consideration of all the aspects of this disciplining i s
beyond the scope of this essay, but I would like to at least note one of these aspects here, and
discuss a second more fully .
Talking Back to Feminist Postmodernism
|
1 S
Any notion of bodily violation is immediately subject to accusations of essentialism,
depending as it seems to, on an implicit "original" body that has been violated . If the subject is
produced in the very act ofviolation, than the violation becomes more enabling than egregious .
This effectively disables feminist claims of harm in discussions of pornography, rape, o r
domestic violence, as it becomes impossible to identify who is being harmed . The political
consequences of the disciplining of feminism away from consideration of bodily violation/har m
are deep and far-reaching .
In this essay, I am concerned more primarily with the disciplining out of feminist concer n
with the biological body . I return here from my lengthy digression into the status of accusations
of essentialism to the question left dangling earlier, the question of the material materializatio n
of the body and language . The biological body seems to have all but disappeared under
conditions of postmodemity, where hormone treatment, plastic surgery and reproductiv e
technologies appear to have done away with biological intransigence once and for all . While
feminist efforts to unlink biology from destiny were extremely important to the birth of th e
feminist movement, and a return to an account of women's social position as causally linked t o
women's biology is neither desirable nor possible, biology remains an important part of how
bodies are lived
. We are not (and here my "ve" includes all humans) emancipated from our
biological bodies in any decisive way, even if they have been rendered unintelligible in certai n
cultural contexts.
Feminists whose focus on women's bodies has led to charges of essentialism, have
generally focused on how women's bodies differ from men's, how reproductive, sexual o r
hormonal differences might provide a key to understanding women's social, moral, or politica l
differences from men-where these differences are understood as positive (i .e. the argument that
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women make better moral choices than men, for example) . Closely related has been an account
of women's social role in raising and nurturing children as foundational for women's difference s
from men. 29 These views have been criticized, in my opinion sometimes correctly, but often
dismissively, as "essentialist" -with essentialism in this case implying a return to or
approximation of a patriarchal "biology as destiny" perspective .
Many feminists have been rightfully suspicious of efforts to define human difference s
biologically, since such efforts have long been key components ofEuropean racism. European
science has shown itself to be virtually obsessed with finding the anatomical or now geneti c
explanations for racial differences, and with using supposed biological differences to justify all
manner of social and political injustice
. The same suspicion also marks disability right s
activism, gayTights activism, and much feminist activism as well . All of these groups-have
every reason to resist any return to the territory of biology as causally explanatory for social ,
economic, prpolitical differences between humans. In the context of feminism; because
women's reproductive capacity or role has been used for centuries to justify women's political
disenfranchisement; feminists-who ground-their own notions of women's difference in biology,
are treading on ground that the rest of us have every reason to call "dangerous ."
At the same time, I-f nd-the , ejection of efforts to explahrwomen's soeial or-politica l
differences from men biologically does not justify a wholesale censure of feminist inquiry int o
the more philosophical questions of what it means to live as embodied beings at all. I am
particularly concerned that an area of inquiry that offers great promise in terms of understanding
what we share with others across all manner of differences is excluded from what counts a s
"good feminism"
. Bodies as texts will yield difference, since the way bodies are inscribed i s
everywhere local, specific, and culturally and historically bounded
. It is the extra-textual body,
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the body that has to breathe, drink, eat, absorb tight -and warrnth, to live-that is the body-in-
common. It is also this extra-textual -body that remains dependent on the earth for sustenance .
But what is an extra-textual body? In what does its irreducibility to the textual consist ?
The textual body, as we have seen, is a body that is culturally inscribed, written on, so to speak
yet not in the sense of some "original" natural thing, some primary matter on which the social i s
later inscribed. The body comes to be an intelligible body at all in the very process of its
inscription. It is interpellated, meaning subjected in the double sense of being made a subjec t
(agent) and a subject (loyal follower) at the same moment . It is a body that performs its
subjection in both senses of the word, its subjection to authority and its subjective resistance t o
authority. Gender is "written" on this body and "read" from it . It is a body that is marked ,
defined, disciplined into being this or that gender, this or that race, but not from some origina l
genderless, raceless material . Like gender itself, the body is a simulacrum, a copy for which
there is no original. It becomes a body through its being gendered, through its being raced . It
may be a body that is surgically, hormonally, anatomically altered to fit a foregoing definition o r
an individual preference-but what is altered cannot be understood to be some authentic, original
thing, what is altered is no-thing at all until the alteration makes it into, marks it, as just this sort
of body.
By insisting on the irreducibility of the body to language, I am not opposing the material
body to the textual body . I am not asserting an extra-textual body in the sense of some primary,
original, untainted antithesis to the social. I am insisting, rather, on a body that can never b e
wholly claimed or contained by the language that does, indeed, inscribe it, even by a
sophisticated deconstructive slight of hand . This body, in fact, materially produces language. It
is itself as much materially produced as it is discursively . I am insisting on bodies that live,
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again in Butler's words, in "a world beyond themselves," where "this movement beyond thei r
own boundaries, a movement of boundary itself," is "quite central to what bodies are (ix)." In
this sense, the body is the boundary between discourse and the material, but boundary is surely
the wrong word, it is more appropriately the link between words and things . It is inscribed" by
discourse, but produces discourse . It is materially produced but produces materially . The body
so understood, is reconnected to its place, its environment, the Earth itself.
It is certainly a cultural achievement of enormous proportions to have rendered such a
connection : unintelligible, but this is precisely the circumstance we find ourselves in under
conditions of postmodernity. Postmodern theory celebrates these circumstances uncritically ,
demonstrating deconstructively that our experience of being set adrift from the world and sealed
into language is "true" at the same time the theorist breaths, drinks, and eats to sustain he r
capacity tq deconstruct.
From a different corner of the world of feminist theory, Eva Kittay's most recent book ,
Love's Labour: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency, contributes to the effort to make
the materiality of the body intelligible . She takes the universality of the human condition of
dependence (i .e . that all of us at least begin our lives dependent for our very survival on others),
to found new notions of equality in an ethics of care . She focuses on dependency work as a kind
of labor that is both necessary and sustaining for human life, though marginalized in areas o f
social thought that have taken the autonomous individual as their model of normalcy_ 31 Kittay' s
work primarily addresses intersubjective dependence, but has important implications for another
kind of dependence, that of all humans on the Earth. Even the "original" dependence, of the
embryo on the human mother is "nested" in a prior and on-going dependence of the mother o n
the Earth itself
. Activities such as breathing, eating, drinking,--all attest to the porosity of the
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border between self and world, and to this primary dependence . Kittay's epistemological move
is to see the experience of human dependence as a place from which we can and should know
what is essential to just social policies .
Similarly, our dependence on the earth can be understood to be a place from which w e
can and do know, and articulate, the materiality of the body . Ironically, it will be the postmodem
notion of subjectivation that will turn us toward a new feminist understanding of the materia l
materialization of the body. This central postmodern insight, whereby discourse is understood to
subject the subject, in the double sense of bound and make, must be brought out of the sealed
discursive universe and down to earth. If we understand dependence on the Earth as not simply
what bounds the subject, though it does, but what produces the subject materially, the
postmodern notion of subjectivation can be reworked on a material level . Just as postmodern
theory has claimed that discourse constructs the subject, we see that outside of and prior t o
discourse the earth itself "constructs" and sustains the subject, moment by moment .
Human beings are so radically dependent on the earth, we still cannot survive for mor e
than four minutes without "taking in" the earth as breath . Where is this dependence? It is
precisely on the porous boundary, the body, which links us to the immediate places we fin d
ourselves (Casey 1993). The earth sustains us only by crossing over this porous boundary, only
by entering and leaving our bodies. The things that sustain us moment by moment ; air, water,
food, light and warmth, do not cease to sustain us because of a fantasy, whether Euro-masculinis t
or feminist, of emancipation from them . Our life-sustaining relationship to the places we inhabi t
may be "disciplined out" of feminist theory in the academy, but it can never be disciplined out o f
our lives .33 The earth is not our prison, but a productive place we inhabit, that constitutes and
enlivens us moment by moment . "Freedom" frotn the earth, from this perspective, is suicidal .
And indeed, the ongoing ecological destruction of our planet has been pointed out by many to b e
a kind of "suicide" .
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A radical feminist philosophy of the body starts from this insight, thatplaces are subject-
productive . This is a bare dependence that is most certainly "universalizing" and "essentialist . "
It also pulls us out of our containment in a sealed textual universe and back to the Earth that
gives us life, breath, and thus speech .
If we move toward new radical feminist interpretation of the body that calls for a
reconnection of bodies to the places that sustain them, we also move toward prioritization of
place, and a politicization of our relationships to place. Some directions such a prioritization and
politicization might take us are: to a more widespread focus on feminist environmentalism ,
feminist geography, and feminist urban planning ; to world food politics ; to global indigenous
human rights activism; to feminist architecture and alternative building practices . The list, as for
any list of "what feminists are interested in," could go on endlessly. The point here is that when
we start from an understanding of the earth and all the particular places it provides us a s
productive places, as places that enliven, enable, and materially construct the bodies that inhabit
them, as places in and through and in relationship to which we are subjectivated-mad e
subjects-we are opened to and engaged immediately with the "world beyond." The distance
between feminist "high theory" and the pressing social issues of our times is narrowed . The
textual universe loses its exclusive hold on us . We return from a fantasy of discursiv e
emancipation from our "imprisonment" in a material body that lives in a material worldto
acknowledge a material world that makes and remakes us moment by moment_ We return ,
against the grain of the phenomenality of daily life under conditions of postmodernity, to the
earth itself_ This earth is not a prison-house, and the body that returns to it is not a text .
1 I am taking the term "talking back" from a section of Judith Butler's Bodies ThatMatter where she cries to
distinguish mere repetition from a kind of repetition or "performance" of gender that is "a kind of talking back" o r
resistance (132)
. She is attempting here to talk about resistance as something that takes place in the "slippage
between discursive command and its appropriated effect (122) ." 1 mean my use of the term to imply both an
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appropriation, and a making over, of feminist postmodernism .
2Butler might say that my very use of the term "postmodernism" in the sweeping way I use it here is an "effort t o
colonize and domesticate these theories under the sign of the same, to group them synthetically and masterfull y
under a single rubric, a simple refusal to grant the specificity of these positions that provides an excuse not to read ,
and not to read closely (Butler 1990, 4) ." Postmodernism is admittedly a diverse and self-contradictory field, as i s
modernism, of course. Postmodern theories have legitimately looked for the "foundations " of modern thought,
lumping things together in the process, in order to try to name and criticize what various modernism have i n
common. If various postmodern theories have laid down certain common foundations in spite of their differences,
and I believe they have, it is also important to "find a way to bring into question the foundations it is compelled to
lay down," also in Butler's words, "It is this movement of interrogating that ruse ofauthority that seeks to close
itself off from contest that is, in my view, at the heart of any radical political project (ibid ., 8)." Here I try to "find a
way" to question what has apparently become unquestionable in much academic feminist practice-th e
textualization of the body .
3 Here I am writing in agreement with such thinkers such as Fredric Jameson, David Harvey, Teny Eagleton, an d
Seyla Benhabib, who have defined their projects against postmodernism more than with it, yet are deeply engaged i n
and with the central concerns that postmodern theories raise . I share a central belief with this emergent critica l
tradition-that postmodernism has material conditions . Such notions as "textuality" and "difference" are interprete d
in part as "symptoms" (or simply phenomenological descriptions) of experience under conditions of extreme
reification
. In other words, we really do experience ourselves as set adrift in the sign-world of the text, or caught up
in an endless play of difference-but these experiences themselves are symptomatic of the material conditions tha t
they seem to deny. Here there is an "outside" to the power of discourse that relocates discourse "inside" a historical
time period and its social and political materialities_ Judith Butler sees the view that "historically a set of theorie s
which are structurally similar emerge as the articulation of an historically specific condition of human reflection," a s
a "Hegelian trope," which serves to falsely unify diverse theories under the assumption that they "symntomatize a
common structural preoccupation (1990, 5) ." This underlying view in turn "authorizes" the falsely universalizing
sign "postmodern
." I dispute this view, along with Fredric Jameson, Teny Eagleton and others . Although I don't
believe developments in theory are simply reducible to certain historical causes, I do believe that writers of theor y
are immersed in material conditions that constitute, at least in large part, certain concerns as more central than
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others, and that it is valuable to bring the conditions which constitute these concerns under reflective scrutiny.
" Sheila Jeffreys, in her account of early lesbian feminism, refers to lesbian feminists as "conscientious objectors" to
gender. She also argues that "Lesbian feminists have always been radical social constructionists in their approach to
lesbianism (1996, 361, 367). "
5 I am leaving out the important role played by the enthroning of desire over reason in postmodern theories more
generally. "Control" may be a misleading term, since a right to express wayward desire does not necessary correlate
on first glance with a notion of "control"-but even so, having the right to desire in feminist postmodernis t
accounts, whether or not by way ofunbridled expression, certainly meshes with early feminist claims that women
should have the power to decide their bodily destiny, in sex and pregnancy.
6 The flurry of publications that established this new relationship took, in its early years, the form of disavowals o f
the "essentialism" of "cultural feminism" (a new, politically charged term for radical feminism), followed by an
articulation of the superior intellectual framework .of some progenitor or proponent of postmodern theory . As
Theresa de Lauretis wrote at around that time, "Angle American (feminists) seem for the most part to be engaged i n
typologizing, defining, and branding various "feminisms' along an ascending scale of theoretico-politica l
sophistication where "essentialism' weighs heavy at the lower end (2) ." Some early examples include Linda
Alooff's 1988 Signs article, "Cultural Feminism versus Post-Structuralism : The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory, "
Alice Echol 's 1983 piece in Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality, entitled, "The New Feminism of Yin and
Yang," and 1984 article in Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality, entitled "The Taming of the Id
Feminist Sexual Politics," and Chris Weedon's 1987 book Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory, al
enthusiastic about what postmodern theories had to offer feminists . 1990, 4). "
' In 1979 Heidi Hartmann had written "The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism : Towards a More
Progressive Union," amidst a flurry of publications about what was, by most feminist accounts, an extremel y
unsatisfactory `union" (Patcheski 1979; Sargeant 1981 ; Weinbaum 1978). The central complaint Hartmann raised
was that, "the ` marriage' of man:ism and feminism has been like the marriage of husband and wife depicted i n
English common law: marxism and feminism are one, and that one is marxsm (424)." This outpouring of
dissatisfaction, however hopeful initially for reconciliation, ended in a nasty divorce sometime in the 1980s .
8 For both Catharine MacKinnon, a radical feminist influenced most directly by Marxism and the central figure i n
radical feminist theory in the academy, and Judith Butler, the central figure in the establishment of feminist
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postmodernism-the collapse of this distinction is Joey to their theoretical work Both argue that the intelligibility o f
sex is constructed through the social conventions .of gender. (MacKinnon 1989, Butler 1999).
9 A classic formulation of this idea can be found in Butler's 199I essay "Decking Out : Performing Identities . " She
gives credit to Esther Newton for the insight that drag "enacts the very structure of impersonation by which any
gender is assumed (21)." This has profound implications for our understanding of gender, "Drag constitutes the
mundane way in which genders are appropriated, theatricalrzed, worn, and done; it implies that all gendering is a
kind of impersonation and approximation. If this is true, it seems, there is no original or primary gender that drag
imitates, but gender is a kind of imitation for which there is no original ; in fact, it is a kind of imitation that produces
the very notion of the original as an effect and consequence of the imitation itself (21) . "
And this body is the "site" of the new feminist epistemology of the simulacrum. Soja's brief rendition of
Baudrillard's "4 epistemes," is useful hare. The first, where appearances mirror reality, gives way to the second,
where appearances are thought to be deceptive and must be sorted through to get to the real underneath (this is th e
"counter-epistemology" of critical theory and practice according to Soja, sand this was early 2nd wave feminis t
epistemology as well) . "Baudrillard's third phase, wherein the image masks the growing absence of a basic realit y
as a prime referential, can be interpreted as the inaugural moment of contemporary postmodernity and the first step
toward the denouement of his fourth phase, when all images become their own pure simulacra, bearing no relation t o
any reality whatsoever (120) . "
Mary Daly's classic formulation of feminist epistemology as a journey from the foreground world of deceptive
patriarchal appearances to the Background realm of "Wild Reality," first appeared in print in 1978 . Mother
formulation was published in 1989 with MacKinnon's treatise on the practice of feminist consciousness raising, here
"Consciousness raising is a face-to-face social experience that strikes at the fabric of meaning of social relations
between and among women and men by calling their givenness into question and reconstituting their meaning in a
transformed and critical way (1989, 95)_" Though very different in starting points and assumptions, both of thes e
accounts involve a sorting through of the givenness of patriarchal relations and the emergence of another (deeper )
meaning.
12
For a good account of the history of and debates about feminist standpoint epistemology see Feminist
Epistemologies, edited by Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, especially "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology :
What Is Strong Objectivity," by Sandra Harding and "Marginality and Epistemic Privilege, " by Bat-Ami Bar On.
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' 3 Butler is certainly the most well-known feminist in the U .S. American academy whose work turns on the abyss of
absence at the heart of the real. Though there are moments ofambiguity in Butler's work, and even confusion, this
theme remains central throughout. Her critiques of Lacan and Zizek, for example, involve the deconstruction of
their notions of "lack" to uncover the prediscursively fixed real (the threat of castration) that is smuggled in unde r
the sign of absence. Butler escavates an even deeper abyss at the heart of "the rock of the real (Butler 1993, 187 -
222) ." The influence of Butler's work, and especially her epistemology, on U .S_ American feminism, has been
dramatic and widespread . There is hardly a session at a feminist academic conference in which Butler's work ,
particularly in terms of its epistemology, is not favorably mentioned.
14 The precise nature of this intelligibility is descnbed in Suzanne Kessler's study of the medical management of
intersexed infants, "The Medical Construction of Gender. " Kessler shows that the single factor determining a n
intersexed infant's "sex assignment" is penis size and functioning, independently of chromosomes, or other
anatomical factors_ Here femaleness is understood to be the absence of maleness, defined as having a decent sized ,
potentially sexually functional penis (225) .
' 5 l am playing on Catharine Mackinnon's similar wording to describe the perceived relation between dominance a n
difference (1989, 220).
16 Catharine Mackinnon comes to mind as a clear example of an almost dogmatic social constructionist who i s
regularly and airnpst ritualistically accused of essentialism . Cressida Heyes argues in her recent book, Line
Drawings, that feminist anti-essentialism is today focused on essentialist moments within social constructionis t
arguments.
11 One of the earliest attempts to grapple critically with this situation I know of, was Diana Fuss 's 1989 Essentially
Speaking: Feminism, Nature, and Difference . This was followed by the 1994 anthology, The Essential Difference ,
edited by Naomi Schor and Elizabeth Weed . Some of the claims I make here, in slightly different terms and with a
different emphasis, were made beautifully by the editors and authors of that volume . Schur rightly points out that the
political stakes of anti-essentialism have to do with feminist intellectuals distancing themselves from lesbian
separatism. For a more recent, and very thoughtful history of the essentialism debates, analysis of what is at stake,
and proposal for a Wittgensteinian way out, see Cressida Heyes Line Drawings: Defining Women Through Feminist
Practice . My emphasis in this article is on the consequences of emphatic anti-essentialism for feminist
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environmentalism, but the many other consequences of this dogmatic intellectual stance should be taken equally
seriously.
18 This claim is certainly the most often cited from de Beauvoir's, The Second Sex.
19 See for example, Anzaldua's and Moraga 's, This Bridge Called My Back . Moraga writes, "Lesbian separatist
utopia? No thank you, sisters . I can't prepare myself a revolutionary packet that makes no sense when I leave the
white suburbs of Watertown, Massachusetts and take the T-line back to Roxbury (xiii)." See also "A Black
Feminist Statement: the Combahee River Collective, " in the same volume, and Angela Davis, Women, Race and
Class. These early critical works did not question the category of woman per se, but rather separatist polities and
the power of white women to define feminism that amounted to a false inclusion of "othf'rr" women in what seemed .
to them to be a white, middle-class, heterosexual category . Elizabeth Spelman took up these critiques in he r
Inessential Woman: Problems ofExclusion in Feminist Thought in 1988. She wrote against "a tendency in
dominant Western feminist thought to posit an essential `wotnatmess' that all women have and share in commo n
despite the racial, class,-religious, ethnic, and cultural differences among us, " and set out to "show that the notion of
a generic `woman' functions in feminist thought much the same way the notion of generic `man' has functioned in
Western philosophy: it obscures the heterogeneity of women (ix) .-
2° "What is woman? Panic, general alarm for an active defense . Frankly, it is a problem that the lesbians donot
have because of a change of perspective, and it would be incorrect to say that lesbians associate, make love, live
with women, for `woman' has meaning only in heterosexual systems of thought and heterosexual economic systems .
Lesbians are not women (Wittig 1980: 438) . "
21 The editors and authors of the volume cited above, The Essential Difference, write this history in a slightly
different way, focusing on the conflict between New French Feminism, bigamy and those influenced by her work ;
and de Beauvoir and Marxist feminists in Europe. I am telling the story in the context of U.S. American feminism,
which is engaged with but not reducible to, the debates in Europe . In the U.S. concrete struggles between women
over issues of heterosexisrn and racism were of enormous influence in the essentialism debates . See note 26, below.
22 Cressida Heyes uses the term "principled anti-essentialism" to differentiate today 's broad strokes anti-essentialism
from the specific critiques that earlier feminists employed (2000) .
23 As Heyes notes, essentialism can be philosophically understood as a quest for purity, where the general concept i s
purified ofany ontological association with its particular instantiations (2000) . This fits well with early feminist
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critiques of essentialism where efforts to critically engage the concept of woman from the diverse realities of
women's experience resulted in important anti-essentialist positions. It is equally important to note however, that
emphatic anti-essentialism ends by demanding another sort of purity, the theoretical purity of a feminism where
every trace of essentialism has supposedly been eradicated (see Bordo, 1993 217, 243) .
24 See note 5, above. In the U.S. American academy, those feminists accused regularly and almost ritualistically o f
essentialism in its most reviled form included Adrienne Rich, Robin Morgan, Andrea Dworkin, Catharine
MacKinnon, and feminists who affirmed an ontological connection between women and nature, such as Mary Dal y
and Susan Griffin . This list, give or take a few names, appeared in article after article, and functioned as a kind of
warning to other feminists. Association with "essentialism" would mean association with this group of feminist s
who academics believed to be discredited to the point of disgrace . Even now, papers at feminist conferences are ful l
of off-hand remarks about Catharine MacKinnon, who seems to have inherited the spite formerly directed at the lis t
of women above, and whose name is thrown out as the "maricee' for essentialist, i .e. bad feminism. Catharine
MacKinnon, an emphatic social constructionist if ever there was one, occupies this position in what can only be
called a wildly ironic twist of the anti-essentialist logic . Not incidentally, all of these women are associated wit h
70's and 80's feminist activism, politicized lesbianism, separatism, andlor anti-pornography work--feMinist
positions that have thrown the norms of heterosexuality deeply into question . As Schor claims, this may be one of
the keys to unlocking the political stakes of what I call emphatic anti-essentialism, and its vehemence .
25 This is also when the term "cultural feminist" was created to stand in for the self-definition "radical feminist" by
those opposed to radical feminist positions .
26 See for example Alcoff 1988, Jane Flax 1987, Sawicki 1988 writes explicitly, " I . . . want to contribute to the
movement beyond polarized debate, specifically by further developing the theoretical and practical implications of a
more adequate sexual politics' in the work of Michel Foucault," in Feminism and Foucault (emphasis mine) .
27 See Roland Martin 1994 for an account of the "chilly research climate" created by the accusation of essentialism.
28 Naomi Schor argues that "definitions are by definition, as it were, essentialist," and claims that anti-essentialists
have essentialized essentialism by creating a context in which all sorts of essentialism are treated as equally heinous .
She argues that the first task is to "de-essentialize essentialism (43) ." Diana Fuss argues similarly that "there is n o
essence to essentialism . . . (historically, philosophically and politically) we can speak only of essentialisms WO."
29 Feminists who have seemed to base their theoretical or political work on women's capacity for motherhood or
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nurturance, or women's physical or biological characteristics, are the particular targets of this critique. Feminists as
diverse as Carol Gilligan, Luce hi pray, andMaria Mies have all been accused of this kind ofessentialism .
30 This should not be read to imply that the body will be lived everywhere and cross-culturally the same, only that it
is lived everywhere. To speak of "the body" is already to speak in a certain cultural context which understands
"body" in an individualizing framework that will not be intelligible in some different contexts .
31 Kittay writes, "Dependents require care. Neither the utterly helpless newborn who must be cared for in all aspects
of her life nor a frail, but fiurctioning, elderly person who needs only assistance to carry on with her life, will survive
or thrive without another who meets her basic needs," and establishes with the first words of her introduction an
"essential" and "universal" fact of human existence from which she builds her critique_ "The dependency critiqu e
considers.. .the inescapable facto f human dependency and the ways in which such labor makes one vulnerable to
domination (16)." The political implications are clear, "How a social order organizes care of these needs is a matte r
of social justice (1)," and similar political implications will be drawn when this concept is extended to dependenc e
on the earth itself.
32 I don't mean my "prior" here to be read temporally, although in a certain developmental sense it can be, I mean it
more in terms of "priority," first in the order of importance-where breathing, drinking, eating have a clear priorit y
over theoretical activity .
33 Here I am writing in agreement with ecofentinists Vandana Shiva and Maria Mies, whose re-valuation of th e
realm of necessity is the centerpiece of their feminist call for a subsistence economy . In addition to the economic
conclusions they draw, however, this insight is important philosophically . They call for a separation of the notions
of"emancipation" and " freedom". Emancipation from the natural world has no part in their definition of freedom,
which is freedom within the realm of necessity, not in contradistinction to it .
